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IRS COMPUTER DATA BANK SEARCHES: AN
INFRINGEMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
SEARCH AND SEIZURE CLAUSE
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years the Internal Revenue Service has faced increas-
ing difficulty in enforcing the internal revenue laws. Studies suggest
that nearly twenty-five percent of all income earners evade income
taxes.' Although there has always been a certain element of society
unwilling to comply with revenue laws, the dramatic increase in
noncompliance deeply concerns the Internal Revenue Service and
Congress.2 An obvious solution, recently instituted by the IRS, is to
implement state-of-the-art computer technology.' With the ability to
© 1985 by Robert Messick
1. Mason, Study of Admitted Income Tax Evasion, LAW & Soc'v REV. (Fall 1979),
reprinted in Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Consumers, and Monetary Affairs,
96th Cong., 1st Sess. 127 (1979).
2. See H.R. REP. No. 861, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 987-89 [hereinafter cited as H.R. REP.
No. 861]. In the period between 1973 and 1981, unreported income rose from $93.9 billion to
$249.7 billion, an increase of 166% in eight years. Administration's Fiscal Year 1984 Budget
Proposals - I, 1983: Hearings on S. 361-74 Before the Senate Finance Comm. on Finance,
98th Cong., 1st Sess. 98 (1983) (statement of Philip E. Coates, Acting Comm'r of IRS) [here-
inafter cited as Coates].
The greatest portion of uncollected taxes is attributable to the "underground economy,"
defined by the General Accounting Office (GAO) as "the aggregate of unrecorded cash activity
and that activity which escapes economic measurement and tax assessment. This includes the
actual exchange of goods or services for cash or for value of other goods or services; that is,
bartering." Underground Economy, 1979: Hearings on H. 781-42 Before the Subcomm. on
Oversight of the Comm. on Ways and Means, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (statement of Allen R.
Voss, Dir., Gen. Gov't Div., GAO). The "underground economy" is defined by the IRS as
including both legal and illegal income. Coates, supra note 2, at 100.
For the calendar year 1981, the IRS estimated a "tax gap" of about $90 billion in uncol-
lected taxes. The taxgap represents the uncollected taxes resulting from overstated deductions
and underreported income, including unreported interest, dividends, tips, and earnings of inde-
pendent contractors from the legal sector; and income derived from organized crime, such as
drugs, gambling, and prostitution.
The IRS estimates that individual taxpayers who do file tax returns are the largest source
of unpaid taxes, totaling nearly $66 billion, while individual nonfilers represent an estimated
loss of only $3 billion in uncollected taxes. Surprisingly, according to IRS estimates, illegal
sector income represents only $9 billion, or 10% of uncollected taxes for 1981. The balance of
the deficit is represented by corporations, trusts and exempt organizations. Coates, supra note
2, at 101.
3. As part of its ambitious computer matching plan, the IRS in 1983 implemented the
Automated Collection System (ACS). ACS is a fully computerized network system for tracking
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search thousands of computer data banks throughout the country
containing hundreds of millions of records on the personal affairs of
citizens, the IRS can tap this wealth of information to track down
noncomplying citizens.
Indiscriminate IRS searches through data files raise serious is-
sues concerning the fundamental rights of an orderly society-the
right of privacy, freedom of association, and the right to be free from
unlawful searches and seizures." The use of computers to ferret out
tax evaders represents a much more serious threat to an individual's
civil liberties than do manual searches through file cabinets. The in-
superable manual task of matching billions of bits of information
scattered across the nation has been conquered by the computer. Us-
ing a common form of identity such as a social security number,
information from diverse sources can be pieced together to provide a
more complete profile of data bank subjects.' The ease with which
matching functions may be performed, and the cost effectiveness of
such functions provide an incentive to apply computer technology
down delinquent taxpayers. The network consists of 30 computer systems in IRS service cen-
ters nationwide and is continuously updated with such information as delinquent taxpayers'
most recent telephone numbers and addresses. At a cost of $300 million, ACS is expected to
collect between $1.5 and $1.7 billion during its first six years of operation. GENERAL AC-
COUNTING OFFICE STUDY, [Gov't Pub. No. GGD-83-103] COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY AT IRS:
PRESENT AND PLANNED 127-29 (1983) [hereinafter cited as COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY AT
IRS]. See New Computerized Taxpayer Compliance Pilot Program, Milwaukee Sentinel, May
11, 1983, at 1, col. 3 (implementation of ACS in Chicago and St. Louis).
4. See infra notes 41-52 and accompanying text for a discussion of the right to privacy,
notes 53-56 for a discussion of the right of freedom of association, and notes 93-190 for a
discussion of the right to be free from unlawful searches and seizures.
5. A data bank subject refers to an individual who is the subject of a computer data file
containing personalized information specific to the individual's affairs.
Justice Douglas aptly described the revealing consequences of laying bare one's bank
records:
The records of checks-now available to the investigators-are highly useful. In
a sense a person is defined by the checks he writes. By examining them the
agents get to know his doctors, lawyers, creditors, political allies, social connec-
tions, religious affiliation, educational interests, the papers and magazines he
reads, and so on ad infinitum. These are all tied to one's social security number;
and now that we have the data banks, these other items will enrich that store-
house and make it possible for a bureaucrat-by pushing one button-to get in
an instant the names of the 190 million Americans who are subversives or po-
tential and likely candidates.
California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 85 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
"Computers facilitate the composition of lists of people connected with various types of
activities and institutions from widely scattered data that probably could not be brought to-
gether manually, enabling previously unknown relationships to be revealed or inferred from
seemingly disparate information." A. MILLER, THE ASSAULT ON PRIVACY: COMPUTERS,
DATA BANKS, AND DOSSIERS 202 (1971).
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against taxpayers.'
This comment will first examine the threats posed to civil liber-
ties by present and planned IRS use of governmental agency and
private data banks. Second, the inadequacies of the first and fifth
amendments as constitutional protections, and the ineffectiveness of
the Privacy Act of 1974 as a statutory restraint upon IRS searches
will be discussed. Finally, this comment will focus on the fourth
amendment search and seizure clause as a possible means of provid-
ing protection to citizens against IRS computer searches of data
banks. This comment concludes that such a search is a general
search prohibited by the fourth amendment, and further, any partic-
ularized search of an individual's records contained on data banks
requires a warrant based upon probable cause.
II. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE DATA BANK SEARCHES
With more than twenty-five percent of its budget and man-
power dedicated to computer operations, the IRS is one of the largest
nondefense users of computers in the federal government. 7 The Ser-
vice presently has in force over forty mainframe computers at ten
IRS service centers and the National Computer Center.8 Beginning
in 1974, the Internal Revenue Service applied its computer resources
to the task of matching information returns9 filed by income payors
6. The costs of computer functions has decreased from a 1950 high of $1.26 per 100,000
calculations to only $0.0025 per 100,000 in 1980. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
[Pub. No. OTA-CIT-146] COMPUTER-BASED NATIONAL INFORMATION SYSTEMS: TECH-
NOLOGY AND PUBLIC POLICY ISSUES 4 (1981) [hereinafter cited as COMPUTER-BASED NA-
TIONAL INFORMATION SYSTEMS].
The IRS has stated that it costs $400 to process 100,000 documents submitted on mag-
netic media as opposed to $20,000 to manually process the same amount of information from
paper documents. Hearings Before the Comm. on Commerce, Consumers, and Monetary Af-
fairs, A Subcomm. of the Comm. on Gov't Operations, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1979) (testi-
mony of Richard L. Fogel, Assoc. Dir., Gen. Govt. Div., GAO) [hereinafter cited as Fogel].
For this reason, the IRS has aggressively promoted that taxpayers submit information docu-
ments on magnetic tape. As a result, the number of documents submitted on magnetic tape has
increased from 48 million in 1968 to about 435 million in 1978-representing 87% of the total
number of documents submitted that year. Id. at 80.
7. COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY AT IRS, supra note 3, at 1.
8. Id. The National Computer Center (NCC), located in Martinsburg, West Virginia,
is the centralized computer center for the IRS. NCC contains the Master File of 145.9 million
individuals and businesses on 1,800 reels of magnetic tape. NCC's library contains a total of
over 178,000 reels of magnetic tape and almost 2,600 computer programs. Id. at 1, 14, 24, and
25.
9. Information returns are transmittals to the IRS describing the nature and amount of
payments to recipients. See I.R.C. §§ 6041-59 for a list of sources of income which require
payors to submit an information return. Section 6041 requires that:
All persons engaged in a trade or business and making payment in the course of
1985]
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with tax returns filed by recipients of the income. During the early
years of this program only about fifty percent of all information re-
turns submitted were actually matched against tax returns.10 The
majority of the matched information returns were on magnetic com-
puter tape generated from the payors' in-house computer record sys-
tems. 1 The remaining fifty percent of the information returns, most
of which were submitted on paper, were typically discarded by the
IRS because of the massive effort required to transfer the informa-
tion to magnetic tapes for computer use.12 More recently, nearly
eighty percent of all information returns filed have been matched
against tax returns." Consequently, the IRS has attained the ability
to match tax returns filed with nearly all information returns sub-
mitted, and thereby generate a list of all persons underreporting in-
come or failing to file tax returns.
such trade or business to another person, of rent, salaries, wages, premiums,
annuities, compensations, remunerations, emoluments, or other fixed or determi-
nable gains, profits, and income. . . of $600 or more in any taxable year...
shall render a true and accurate return to the Secretary. . . setting forth the
amount of such gains, profits, and income, and the name and address of the
recipient of such payment.
I.R.C. § 6041 (West Supp. 1985).
The IRS expects to receive nearly one billion information returns for the tax year 1984.
WALL STREET J., Feb. 22, 1984, at 1, col. 5. However, with the enactment of I.R.C. § 60501
in the Tax Reform Act of 1984, the information returns required to be filed for the year 1985
could easily exceed 5 billion in number. Section 60501 requires any person engaged in a trade
or business who receives, in the course of that trade or business, more than $10,000 in cash or
foreign currency in one or more related transactions, to report the receipt of the money to the
IRS and to provide a statement to the payor. I.R.C.§ 60501 (West Supp. 1985). Transactions
subject to the reporting requirements of § 60501 include, but are not limited to, "a sale of
goods or services; a sale of real property; a sale of intangible property; a rental of real or
personal property; an exchange of cash for other cash; the establishment or maintenance of or
contribution to a custodial, trust, or escrow arrangement; a payment of a preexisting debt; a
conversion of cash to a negotiable instrument; or the making or repayment of a loan." 50 Fed.
Reg. 21,239 (1985) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1, § 1.60501-1 (T)) (proposed May 23,
1985). Section 60501 also encompasses transactions with dealers in precious metals, stones or
jewels, pawnbrokers, loan or finance companies, insurance companies, and travel agencies.
H.R. REP. No. 861, supra note 2. The penalty for failure to file the necessary information
returns is $50 per failure, subject to a maximum of $50,000 per calendar year. I.R.C. §§ 6652,
6678 (1984).
10. See Subterranean or Underground Economy: Hearings Before the Comm. on Com-
merce, Consumer, and Monetary Affairs, A Subcomm. of the Comm. on Gov't Operations,
96th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1979) (statement of Jerome Kurtz, Comm'r, IRS) [hereinafter cited as
Kurtz].
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. GAO STUDY OF IRS TAXPAYER NON-COMPLIANCE [PuB. No. GGD 82-341 FUR-
THER RESEARCH INTO NONCOMPLIANCE IS NEEDED TO REDUCE GROWING TAX LOSSES
(1982) [hereinafter cited as IRS NON-COMPLIANCE STUDY].
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The effectiveness of the matching system has not been satisfac-
tory." The IRS has concluded that because nearly half of all
nonfilers identified by a computer match are not required to file a
return,15 pursuit of all nonfilers without further differentiation
would be unproductive."
Realizing the need for more comprehensive computer matching,
the IRS has developed a predictive model which takes into account
other sources of information and determines what group of persons is
least likely to comply with the revenue laws. 17 In order to implement
its ambitious plan to track down noncompliers by computer, the In-
ternal Revenue Service expects to spend nearly two billion dollars
over the next six to eight years on state-of-the-art computer technol-
ogy.'" With the combination of massive computer systems and access
14. IRS received over 588 million information documents of all types for tax year 1981.
For cases generated in prior years and completed in fiscal year 1981, document matching
resulted in additional tax assessments totaling about $500 million - less than 1% of the total
tax gap. IRS NON-COMPLIANCE STUDY, supra note 13. See also Fogel, supra note 6, at 78-
81, criticizing the IRS for ineffective handling of the compliance program; suggesting that
"payors are not submitting all required information documents," "many documents submitted
are not used," "[m]ore income could be subjected to matching," and "[a] management informa-
tion system is needed for proper program planning and evaluation."
15. An IRS study for the year 1976 concluded that nonfilers are predominately of a low
income status with 52% having incomes of $5,000 or less. Nonfilers account for only about
16% of lost revenues. Kurtz, supra note 10, at 7.
16. IRS has calculated that the greatest return of revenue per hours of examination
(audit) time is naturally from the highest generators of income - the top 1,200 to 1,300 corpo-
rations. Thereafter, as the income level drops, so does the return on examinations. Therefore,
examinations of nonfilers in the lowest earning category, which yield the lowest return on
examination, can only be justified by the need to maintain an IRS "presence" among all strata
of taxpayers. Id. at 4-19.
17. During hearings before the Committee on Government Operations, Commissioner
Kurtz stated:
We are trying to improve our methodology for selecting nonfiler cases by devel-
oping a predictive model to detect nonfilers. The concept here is to design a
more objective, scientifically designed scoring system that will identify the most
productive nonfiler cases. We need such a system because we anticipate a back-
log of 700,000 uncompleted nonfiler investigations by the end of 1980 and must
select those cases to which we will devote our limited resources.
Id. at 7.
In response, Congressman Joel Deckard querried Commissioner Kurtz whether the IRS was
using a profile of typical nonfiler or tax-avoidance persons as a basis for random selection of
audits. The commissioner replied that the IRS does have such a profile system which is used in
conjunction with various commercial data banks capable of selecting persons from particular
professions or cities. Kurtz, supra note 10, at 34.
18. See generally COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY AT IRS, supra note 3. The IRS originally
proposed, at a cost of $1.8 billion, a "Tax Administration System" (TAS). TAS would have
been a nationwide network of computers hooked together by telecommunications with the
NCC (National Computer Center) functioning as a taxpayer directory and providing national
reports while continuing to process and match information returns. Conre- .4-:-, •
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to thousands of data banks from which to draw personal information
on millions of individuals, the IRS will have the capacity to conduct
thorough computer searches of most citizens.
A. Internal Revenue Service Access to Government Data Banks
Notwithstanding the Privacy Act of 1974,19 the IRS has author-
ity to gain access to interagency data banks for the purpose of en-
forcing criminal laws. The intended purpose of the Privacy Act is to
restrict access to, and transfers or disclosures of, personal informa-
tion stored on government data banks. Section 0)(2) of the Privacy
Act exempts from its prohibition against disclosure those agencies
which have as their principal function any activity pertaining to the
enforcement of criminal laws.20 Because one of the functions of the
IRS is enforcement of the criminal provisions of the Internal Reve-
nue Code,21 the IRS appears to be exempt from section (j)(2).
With such broad discretion the IRS may acquire information of
a personal nature from thousands of government data banks. By
1971 the federal government maintained 5,961 computers. 22 On the
state level, the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration reported
that in 1976 over 4,000 criminal justice data banks were available
for nationwide transfer of information from state data banks. 23 In
addition, state law enforcement agencies can access the Federal Bu-
reau of Investigation National Crime Information Center (NCIC)
which maintains records on persons, vehicles, license plates, articles,
guns, securities, and boats - all for the purpose of identifying stolen
property and wanted criminals. 4 The FBI also maintains "narrative
sal due to concern over the substantial threat of invasion of privacy. The Office of Technology
Assessment likewise expressed fears over the proposal. Id. at 61. Congress subsequently ap-
proved a repackaged proposal effectively requesting a system with the same capabilities as
TAS. Id. at 61.
19. The Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1982), was enacted to protect individual
privacy interests from government misuse of federal records containing personal information.
For further discussion of the Privacy Act, see infra notes 59-92 and accompanying text.
20. 5 U.S.C § 552ao)(2).
21. Internal Revenue Code § 7608 grants to Criminal Investigation Division Agents of
the IRS the authority to execute and to serve search and arrest warrants, to make arrests based
upon probable cause without warrant, and to seize property to enforce the criminal provisions
of the IRS code.
22. A. WESTIN, DATABANKS IN A FREE SOCIETY: COMPUTERS, RECORD-KEEPING AND
PRIVACY 29 (1972) [hereinafter cited as DATABANKS IN A FREE SOCIETY].
23. 1 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMIN., DIRECTORY
OF AUTOMATED CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFORMATION SYSTEMS (1976). The Law Enforcement
Assistance Administration of the Department of Justice is required to promulgate privacy and
security regulations covering federally-funded criminal justice information systems.
24. DATABANKS IN A FREE SOCIETY, supra note 22, at 50.
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files" which contain applications for federal jobs, special investiga-
tions conducted by the FBI, credit-checks, reports of agent inter-
views, documentary materials, informant reports, and "technical in-
formant" data including wiretapping and bugging information. 5
The files contain both verified and "raw" unconfirmed material. 6
During the 1960's, the United States Army Intelligence actively
collected personal data on lawful political organizations and their
members including the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), the
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
(NAACP), the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC),
and the Women's Strike for Peace.27 The IRS could conceivably use
this information with the assumption that "politically subversive" in-
dividuals are more likely to violate the tax laws.
In the early 1970's, the IRS conducted research on the relation-
ship between a taxpayer's political affiliation and his or her propen-
sity toward tax evasion.28 In the process of its research and surveil-
lance, the IRS collected a considerable quantity of information on
many individuals and businesses. 9 After Senate oversight hearings
on the matter, the program was disbanded.
Because of the tremendous amount of information that govern-
ment agencies collect for various reasons, the federal government has
amassed an incredible array of data banks.80 In addition to govern-
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. A. MILLER, THE ASSAULT ON PRIVACY: COMPUTERS, DATA BANKS, AND Dos-
SIERS 40 (1971).
28. See SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY: CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE SEN-
ATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, S. REP. No. 1227, 93th Cong., 2d Sess. 23 (1974).
29. The Internal Revenue Service program, known as the Special Service Staff (SSS),
compiled political intelligence data on at least 11,000 individuals and organizations deemed to
be "activists, . . . ideological, militant, subversive, radical." Id.
30. As of 1974, over 850 federal data bank systems existed. Id. at 14. The following is a
partial list of federal agency data banks accessible to the IRS:
Social Security Admin.
U.S. Customs Service, Financial Law Enforcement Center
Dep't of Health and Human Services (formerly HEW)
Dep't of Justice (Nat'l Crim Justice Info & Statistical Service)
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Veterans Admin.
Nat'l Aeronautics & Space Admin.
Office of Naval Intelligence
U.S. Postal Inspector's Office
Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs
Immigration and Naturalization Service
Dep't of Defense
Dep't of Labor
1985]
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ment files, the Internal Revenue Service also has access to thousands
of private data banks, most notably those belonging to banks, credit
reporting agencies and commercial mailing list companies.
B. Internal Revenue Service Access to Private Data Banks
Commercial bank computer data files typically contain informa-
tion supplied by applications for new accounts, credit requests, and
subsequent banking transactions."' Credit reporting agencies possess
information from a myriad of sources, including property records,
landlords, employers, banks, credit references, court records, newspa-
pers, trade periodicals, and bulletins from protective agencies han-
Secret Service Comm'n
U.S. Coast Guard
Dep't of Treasury
Dep't of the Interior
Office of Personnel Mgmt.
Selective Service Admin.
Army and Air Force Exchange Serv.
Federal Deposit Insurance Corp.
Trials Interagency Litigation Systems (TRIALS)
Bureau of Personnel Investigations, Civil Service Comm'n
Defense Logistics Agency
Dep't of Commerce (Bureau of Economic Analysis)
Illustrative of the scope of information retained in government agency data banks is the
following NASA employee file listing:
birth date; social security number; home address and telephone number; marital
status; references; veteran preference, tenure, handicap; position description,
past and present salaries; payroll deductions, leave; letters of commendation and
reprimand; adverse actions, charges and decisions on charges; notice of reduc-
tion-in-force; personnel actions, including but not limited to, appointment, reas-
signment, demotion, detail, promotion, transfer and separation, minority group;
records relating to life insurance, health and retirement benefits; designation of
beneficiary; training; performance ratings; physical examinations; criminal mat-
ters; data documenting the reasons for personnel actions or decisions made about
an individual; awards; and other information relating to the status of the
individual.
In addition to the internal uses of the information contained in this system
of records, the following are routine uses outside of NASA for information
maintained on . . . employees only: (1) Provide information in accordance with
legal or policy directives and regulations to the Internal Revenue Service . ...
48 Fed. Reg. 48,539, at 48,551(1983).
31. DATABANKS IN A FREE SOCIETY, supra note 22, at 121. Bank records and other
third party records are not available to the IRS without an administrative summons. I.R.C. §
7609 (1982). Under § 7609, except in unusual circumstances, the IRS is required to provide a
bank customer 23 days notice when it issues an administrative summons to review records at a
bank. After receiving notice, the customer has a right to object to enforcement of the summons
before a U.S. district court. An individual is also entitled to notice before the IRS issues an
administrative summons on third-party recordkeepers such as credit unions, consumer report-
ing agencies, credit card companies, brokers, attorneys and accountants.
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dling fraud.3 2 The scope of the information encompasses such mat-
ters as "age, marital status, dependencies, residential history,
occupation, financial resources, bank references, manner of payment
of accounts, loans and other credit extensions in the trade and lend-
ing institutions, and litigation history, if any."33 Credit bureaus may
pry even deeper into matters so personal as an applicant's reputa-
tion, character, and morals. Since credit agencies are in the business
of selling information, they are just as willing to sell their informa-
tion to the IRS as to any other buyer.3"
The mailing list industry is another source of personal informa-
tion maintained on data banks. Mailing lists are data compilations
predominately gathered from public sources, including "official
records, telephone books, city directories, membership lists, news
clippings, customer lists, lists of contest participants, door-to-door
canvassing, and convention rosters." " Government sources include
lists of pilots, boat owners, ham-radio operators, veterans, and motor
vehicle owners.3 6 Information is also purchased from commercial
sources such as credit card customer accounts and publishers.
37
Mailing list data banks contain information on an individual's
business connections, marital status, occupation, place of employ-
ment, telephone number, and status as a renter or homeowner. 8
Continuous updating of changes in address, employment, subscrip-
tion offers accepted, purchase clubs joined, and retail store transac-
tions reflect many buying preferences and habits." With access to
32. SENATE JUDICIARY COMM., STATE OF NEW YORK, REPORT OF THE SUBCOMM.
ON RIGHT OF PRIVACY (1969).
33. Id. at 9-10.
34. Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (1982), permits the IRS to obtain
identifying data from a credit agency's data banks. In United States v. Davey, 426 F.2d 842
(2nd Cir. 1970), Credit Data Corporation, a nationwide credit agency, challenged IRS sum-
monses seeking credit records in the company's data bank, asserting that the IRS sought to use
Credit Data Corporation as a vast private databank for its own investigatory purposes and that
the IRS summonses were unreasonable searches and seizures. In response, the federal district
court held that "[t]he government has the right to require the production of relevant informa-
tion wherever it may be lodged and regardless of the form in which it is kept and the manner
in which it may be retrieved, so long as it pays its reasonable share of the costs of retrieval."
Id. at 845.
35. DATABANKS IN A FREE SOCIETY, supra note 22, at 154-55.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 155.
39. Id. at 157. Retail store point-of-sale terminals collect such information on customers
as name, items purchased, exact time and location of purchase, and financial status as it relates
to credit transactions. COMPUTER-BASED NATIONAL INFORMATION SYSTEMS, supTa note 6,
at 76.
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such comprehensive information drawn from diverse sources, the In-
ternal Revenue Service can readily construct a complete dossier on
an individual and map out his or her past, present and anticipated
transactions. Under no other circumstances than by computer match-
ing of data banks can the IRS so readily discover one's personal rep-
utation, morals, preferences, habits and day-to-day transactions in
business and private lives.
Despite the fact that a significant portion of private data bank
information is derived from public sources, the compilation and as-
similation of such data from all avenues of life threatens normal soci-
etal expectations of privacy.'0 These important societal interests in
privacy and noninterference by government have traditionally been
protected by such constitutional and statutory provisions as the first,
fourth and fifth amendment, and the Privacy Act of 1974. Neverthe-
less, these provisions have their shortcomings as applied to IRS com-
puter data bank searches. The inadequacies of each of these provi-
sions and the potential strength of the fourth amendment as a
protection against IRS data bank searches are discussed in the fol-
lowing sections of this article.
III. INADEQUACIES OF CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY
PROTECTIONS AGAINST IRS COMPUTER SEARCHES
A. Constitutionally Protected Rights
The constitution protects certain basic privacy rights from gov-
ernment intermeddling. Although the concept of a constitutional
right of privacy is somewhat ephemeral, the right of privacy assumes
at least three forms. "The first is the right of the individual to be
free in his private affairs from governmental surveillance and intru-
sion. The second is the right of an individual not to have his private
affairs made public by the government. The third is the right of an
individual to be free in action, thought, experience, and belief from
governmental compulsion."' The right to be free from governmental
surveillance and intrusion is grounded in the fourth amendment.' 2
The other two rights are grounded in, among other constitutional
40. See infra note 61. In Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977), the Supreme Court
stated: "We are not unaware of the threat to privacy implicit in the accumulation of vast
amounts of personal information in computerized data banks or other massive government
files." 429 U.S. at 605.
41. Kurland, The Private 1, 1976 U. CHI. MAG. 7, 8, quoted in Whalen v. Roe, 429
U.S. at 599 n.24.
42. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. at 599 n.24.
[Vol. 25
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provisions, the first and fifth amendments."'
1. The Right of Privacy
The constitutionally protected right of privacy emanating from
the first and fifth amendments create a protected zone of privacy en-
compassing "only [those] personal rights that can be deemed 'funda-
mental' or 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.' "" The activi-
ties ordinarily embraced by this zone of privacy relate to the intimate
facets of an individual's personal life - marriage, procreation, contra-
ception, family relationships, and child rearing and education.
4 5
In Jaffess v. Secretary of HEW, 46 a federal district court re-
fused to extend privacy rights to federal interagency transfers of data
for computer cross-checking of veterans' benefits. More recently,
though, the Fifth Circuit held that the constitutionally guarded
"zone of privacy" encompasses an individual's interest in avoiding
disclosure of personal matters.47
The United States Supreme Court, in Whalen v. Roe,4 simi-
larly construed the constitutional right of privacy as protecting
against governmental disclosure of personal matters. The Court sug-
gested that when the government maintains on computer data banks
personal information concerning an individual's medical history, the
government has a duty to safeguard against public disclosure of the
confidential information. 4'9 The Court, however, expressed no opin-
ion as to whether privacy rights may prevent interagency transfers of
such information."
Lower courts in applying Whalen have taken divergent ap-
43. Id.
44. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973), quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S.
319, 325 (1937); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
45. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 713 (1976); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
"If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to
be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a
person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child." 405 U.S. at 453 (emphasis in
original).
46. 393 F. Supp. 626 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). See also Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589 (1977)
(N.Y. statute authorizing maintenance of computer files of individuals receiving certain pre-
scription drugs declared constitutional). But see Roe v. Ingraham, 480 F.2d 102, 107-08 (2nd
Cir. 1973), remanded, 364 F. Supp. 536 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (disclosure of personal drug infor-
mation a threat to constitutional privacy).
47. Johnson v. IRS, 700 F.2d 971, 976 (5th Cir. 1983).
48. 429 U.S. at 599-600.
49. Id. at 599.
50. Cf Jaffess v. Secretary of HEW, 393 F. Supp. 626, 629 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (dissemi-
nation of personal information within the government not offensive to constitutional privacy).
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proaches. While some courts only protect the confidentiality of tradi-
tional zones of privacy within the context of the home or family,5
other courts protect confidential information when the potential
harm to an individual exceeds the benefits gained by the govern-
ment.52 The lack of certainty among the courts as to the boundaries
of an individual's zone of privacy provides a data bank search subject
with little assurance that traditional notions of privacy will prevent
IRS computer searches.
2. The Right of Freedom of Association
Another protected interest, not within the zone of privacy, but
encompassed by the first amendment, is the right of freedom of asso-
ciation. A restrictive reading of the right of association disfavors data
bank search subjects. Based on the Supreme Court decision in
NAACP v. Alabama,8 it may be argued that IRS data bank
searches violate first amendment rights of freedom of association by
selectively prosecuting individuals solely on the grounds of their as-
sociation to a specific organization.
For example, if the IRS' profile predictive model 5' were to sug-
gest that Libertarians constitute a large percentage of tax evaders,
and on that assumption the IRS were to seek the records listing all
followers of that belief, then the Libertarians' associational rights
may be violated. In practicality, no violation of associational rights
has occurred when the information sought is necessary to protect a
legitimate government interest. 55 In all likelihood, application of the
51. See Plante v. Gonzalez, 575 F.2d 1119, 1132 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
1129 (1979).
52. See Doe v. Webster, 606 F.2d 1226, 1238 n.49 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (constitutional
right to privacy limits the government's ability to disseminate information about individual's
criminal records). See also Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Serv., 433 U.S. 425, 458 (1977)(President's primary interest in personal communications outweighed by government's need for
administrative information); United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 638 F.2d 570, 578 (3d
Cir. 1980) (employee's privacy interest in medical records outweighed by government's need
for administrative information).
53. 357 U.S. 449 (1958). In this case, the Alabama State Attorney General sought dis-
closure of the Association's membership list. The Supreme Court reversed the state court dis-
closure order, holding: "The immunity ... is here so related to the rights of the members to
pursue their lawful private interests privately and to associate freely with others in so doing as
to come within the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 466.
54. See supra notes 17, 28.
55. Baird v. Arizona, 401 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1971) (state inquiry into applicant's past associa-
tions is a legitimate concern for admission to state bar); cf Gibson v. Florida Legislative Inves-
tigating Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 546 (1963) ("an essential prerequisite to the validity of an
investigation which intrudes into the area of constitutionally protected rights of speech, press,
association and petition is that the State convincingly show a substantial relation between the
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freedom of association test to IRS data bank searches would proba-
bly balance in favor of the government in recognition of the need to
maintain 'fiscal responsibility.' 5 The inadequacies of these constitu-
tional provisions in restraining IRS computer data bank searches
leaves an individual exposed to the vagaries of equally inadequate
statutory provisions for protecting privacy.
B. Statutory Protections
While one may disparage the lack of definitive support amplify-
ing constitutional civil rights for data bank subjects, no greater relief
is to be found in statutory provisions. Even though there are numer-
ous statutes tangentially related to data bank protections, 57 the ab-
sence of a national policy or statutory scheme for dealing effectively
with governmental transfer and disclosure of data leaves the data
bank subject sorely in need of protection. 8 One statute designed to
grant some relief is the Privacy Act of 1974.
information sought and a subject of overriding and compelling state interest.").
56. United States v. Grayson County State Bank, 656 F.2d 1070, 1074 (5th Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 455 U.S. 920 (1982) ("government interest in maintaining the integrity of its
fiscal policies" outweighs "incidental burden" on church members' first amendment rights
caused by IRS search through church records and bank accounts); United States v. Egan, 459
F.2d 997, 998 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 875 (1972) (government interest in rais-
ing tax revenues outweighs taxpayer's fifth amendment right in not filing self-incriminating
tax returns); accord, United States v. Jordan, 508 F.2d 750, 752 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 842 (1975).
57. See, e.g., Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978, 12 U.S.C. § 3401 (1982) (due
process requirements for release of bank records); Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act
of 1974, 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (1982) (access to educational records); Fair Credit Reporting Act,
15 U.S.C. § 1681 (1982) (protections for individual's credit agency records); Federal Child
Support Enforcement Act, 42 U.S.C. § 653 (1982) (requiring agencies to provide information
to assist in locating parents of abandoned children); Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1137 (Supp. 1985) (requiring states to match federally-obtained information with state infor-
mation to verify eligibility for medicaid, unemployment compensation and food stamps); 26
U.S.C. § 7609 (1982) (third-party recordkeeper administrative summonses); Paper Work Re-
duction Act of 1980, 44 U.S.C. § 3501 (1982) (efforts to streamline government management
and data processing).
58. As one commentator observed:
An information disclosure policy of the federal government simply does not
exist. The current diversity of federal agencies' policies regarding the handling
of private information grew without statutory rhyme or reason. The lack of
direction contributes to a suspicion which renders the collection and use of pri-
vate sector information more difficult for all federal agencies. The suspicion
could be significantly alleviated by a uniform federal policy on disclosure
standards.
O'Reilly, Who's on First?: The Role of the Office of Management and Budget in Federal
Information Policy, 10 J. OF LEGrs. 95, 133 (1983).
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1. Privacy Act of 1974
One of the more important statutes intended to provide protec-
tion for data bank subjects is the Privacy Act of 1974 (the Privacy
Act).5" Hurriedly enacted at the close of the 93rd Congress, the Pri-
vacy Act is the result of unreconciled Senate and House bills on pri-
vacy, later amended by a compromise bill developed by staff and
members."
The preamble to the Privacy Act proclaims its purpose to be "to
safeguard individual privacy from the misuse of federal records, to
provide that individuals be granted access to records concerning them
which are maintained by federal agencies, to establish a Privacy Pro-
tection Commission, and other purposes.""1 The Privacy Act, how-
ever, has proven to be ineffective in curbing federal agency depriva-
tions of civil rights."
59. 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1982).
60. The only record of the compromise amendment is a staff memo inserted into the
Congressional Record. Many of the provisions of the Privacy Act are not explained in Com-
mittee reports. For a compilation of the legislative history, see the Privacy Act of 1974, Pub L.
No. 93-579, 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6916-99.
61. Section 2(a) of the Privacy Act reiterates the congressional findings:
Sec.2.(a) The Congress finds that -
(1) the privacy of an individual is directly affected by the collection, main-
tenance, use, and dissemination of personal information by Federal agencies;
(2) the increasing use of computers and sophisticated information technol-
ogy, while essential to the efficient operations of the Government, has greatly
magnified the harm to individual privacy that can occur from any collection,
maintenance, use, or dissemination of personal information;
(3) the opportunities for an individual to secure employment, insurance,
and credit, and his right to due process, and other legal protections are endan-
gered by the misuse of certain information systems;
(4) the right to privacy is a personal and fundamental right protected by
the Constitution of the United States; and
(5) in order to protect the privacy of individuals identified in information
systems maintained by Federal agencies, it is necessary and proper for the Con-
gress to regulate the collection, maintenance, use, and dissemination of informa-
tion by such agencies.
Privacy Act of 1974, Preamble, Pub. L. No. 93-579, 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
(88 Stat.) 2177-78.
62. The Privacy Protection Study Commission, established by § 5 of the Privacy Act,
supra note 61, to study the issues raised by the legislation, concluded in its July 1977 report
that the Privacy Act needs "significant modification and change if it is to accomplish its objec-
tive within the Federal government." PRIVACY PROTECTION STUDY COMMISSION, PERSONAL
PRIVACY IN AN INFORMATION SOCIETY 498 (1977). Similar conclusions were reached in the
COMMISSION OF FEDERAL PAPERWORK, CONFIDENTIALITY AND PRIVACY 163 (1977).
At the first congressional oversight hearing of the Privacy Act since the law's enactment in
1974, the House Subcommittee on Government Information, Justice and Agriculture examined
the Office of Management and Budget implementation and enforcement of the Privacy Act.
Subcommittee Chairman Glenn English complained that "no one seems to consider any more
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a. General Requirements of the Privacy Act
The primary principle underlining the Privacy Act is that the
data subject should have a right to control access to information
about himself and to prevent its use, without his consent, for pur-
poses wholly unrelated to those for which it was collected. This prin-
ciple is incorporated into the Privacy Act by restricting agency dis-
closures of personal data,68 and by requiring accountings of record
disclosures. 64 In addition, the Privacy Act provides that agencies
must adhere to standards for the collection and maintenance of data
in an accurate manner, as well as notice in the federal register of the
existence and uses of such data. 6' The Privacy Act also places re-
strictions on records relating to the data subject's exercise of his or
her First Amendment rights. 6 Both civil and criminal remedies are
authorized for violations of the Privacy Act.
6 7
b. Exemptions from the Privacy Act
The Privacy Act provides for both general and specific exemp-
tions from the restrictions on disclosures and transfers of data. The
general exemption covers records maintained by the Central Intelli-
gence Agency and other criminal law enforcement agencies.68 The
whether the Privacy Act prohibits a particular use of information. As long as an agency pub-
lishes a routine use notice in the Federal Register it can do pretty much anything it wants with
the information." Administration's Fiscal Year Proposals: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Gov't Information, Justice and Agriculture, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 115 (1983).
63. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b).
64. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(c).
65. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e). Agencies are under an affirmative duty to maintain accurate,
relevant, timely and complete records under § (e)(5). Fiorella v. HEW, 2 G.D.S. 81,363
(W.D. Wash. 1981). The duty is not brought about merely by an individual's request to
amend his records.
Publication requirements in the federal register are delineated at 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(1 1).
66. Subsection 552a(e)(7) states:
Each agency that maintains a system of records shall- maintain no record
describing how any individual exercises rights guaranteed by the First Amend-
ment unless expressly authorized by statute or by the individual about whom
the record is maintained or unless pertinent to and within the scope of an au-
thorized law enforcement activity.
5 U.S.C. 552a(e)(7). Subsection 552(e)(7) does not preclude the IRS from maintaining records
on tax protestors. Tate v. Bindscil, 2 G.D.S. 82,114 (D.S.C. 1981).
67. 5 U.S.C. §§ 552a(g), (i). For further discussion on remedies under the Privacy Act,
see infra notes 74-82 and accompanying text.
68. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(j). To qualify under the law enforcement exemption, an agency
must have as its "principal function any activity pertaining to the enforcement of criminal
laws, including police efforts to prevent, control, or reduce crime or to apprehend criminals,
and the activities of prosecutors, courts, correctional, probation, pardon, or parole authorities."
§ 5 U.S.C. 552a(j)(2). This provision allows for broad statutory interpretation. Although the
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specific exemptions apply to classified records, law enforcement ma-
terial not covered by the general exemption, Secret Service records
concerning protection of government officials, statistical records, and
certain personnel records.69 An additional exemption permits trans-
fers of data "compiled in reasonable anticipation of a civil action or
proceeding." 7
The general and specific exemptions stated above are not self-
executing and may not be asserted by an agency in a particular case
unless the agency has issued published regulations declaring it is ex-
empt under the provisions. Therefore, most agencies issue regula-
tions in order to take advantage of the Privacy Act's exemption
requirements.
The Internal Revenue Service may satisfy the general law en-
forcement agency exemption since it enforces both civil and criminal
laws governing the collection of revenue. A separate division of the
Service, the Criminal Investigation Division (CID), is the most
likely candidate to qualify under the law enforcement exemption,
thus permitting the IRS to gain access to other agency data banks.
Most likely, the IRS would liberally construe the specific exemption
permitting transfers of information compiled in anticipation of civil
actions.
A major exception to the prohibition against interagency trans-
fers of information is the "routine use" exception.7 1 Information may
be transferred to another agency if the data is declared a "routine
use;" that is, if the information will be used "for a purpose which is
compatible with the purpose for which it was collected. '7 2 Because
many agencies invoke the routine use exception without restraint due
to ineffective supervision by the Office of Management and Budget,
the routine use exception has proven to be an ineffective restriction
on interagency transfers of data banks.7
principal function of the IRS may not be criminal law enforcement, IRS agents are authorized
to enforce the criminal provisions of the internal revenue laws. See supra note 21. Further-
more, as in other areas of law, the effectiveness of the IRS in collecting revenue depends to a
large degree on the threat of enforcement of criminal laws.
69. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(k).
70. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(d)(5).
71. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b).
72. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(a)(7); 43 Fed. Reg. 2,653.
73. As part of the Privacy Act, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) was
assigned the duty to "(1) develop guidelines and regulations for the use of agencies in imple-
menting the provisions of [the Act] . . . ; and (2) provide continuing assistance to and over-
sight of the implementation of [the Privacy Act] .... " 5 U.S.C. § 552a.
The duty was reiterated in the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980 (PRA), 44 U.S.C. §§
3401-3420, requiring OMB to continue to monitor agency compliance with the Privacy Act
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c. Remedies under the Privacy Act
The remedial provisions of the Privacy Act contain both crimi-
nal penalties for violations by officers and employees74 and a civil
remedial scheme for agency violations of the Privacy Act. 75 The re-
medial scheme has been criticized as ineffective."
Different remedies are available for violation of different provi-
sions of the Privacy Act. 7 If a data subject is denied access to and
amendment of his data file, a district court may enjoin the offending
agency and order such amendment.78 If an agency intentionally or
wilfully fails to comply with the provisions of the Privacy Act in
such a way as to have an adverse effect on a data subject, the court
may award damages of not less than $1,000.79
In one of the few cases granting damages for willful violations,
the Fifth Circuit in Johnson v. Department of the Treasury8" upheld
an award of the minimum $1,000 damages against the IRS for fail-
and "related information management law" - a term undefined in PRA. 44 U.S.C. § 3404(").
The 1982 OMB guidelines specify that federal agencies conducting computer matches
must give notice in the Federal Register with a description of the matching program and the
purpose for which the program is being conducted. 47 Fed. Reg. 21656, 21656-58 (1982). The
guidelines also provide that only minimum information necessary for a match should be dis-
closed, that there should be written interagency agreements on data use, that there should be
controls on disposition and return of records, and that notices should be sent to OMB and to
Congress concerning the creation of new systems of records as a result of any computer match.
Id.
In addition, the guidelines require that an agency publish "appropriate 'routine use' no-
tices in the Federal Register, if necessary." Id. at 21,658. This imprecise requirement contin-
ues to permit agencies to machinate the "routine use" requirement by issuing convoluted no-
tices such as the following, issued by the Office of Personnel Management: "[aln integral part
of the reason that these records are maintained is to protect the legitimate interests of the
government and, therefore, such a disclosure is compatible with the purpose for maintaining
these records." KIRCHNER, A History of Computer Matching in the Federal Government,
COMPUTERWORLD, Dec. 14, 1981, at 15.
74. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(i)(1).
75. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(1).
76. THE REPORT OF THE PRIVACY PROTECTION STUDY COMMISSION 130-131 (1977).
77. Agency conduct subject to civil action is identified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 552a(g)(1)(A)-(D),
with remedies specified in subsections (g)(2)-(4).
78. 5 U.S.C. §§ 552a(g)(1)(A), (g)(3)(A).
79. 5 U.S.C. §§ 552a(g)(1)(D), (g)(4)(A). An adverse effect to data subject's character,
rights, qualifications or opportunities may result from an agency's failure to maintain accurate,
relevant, timely and complete records. 5 U.S.C. 552a(g)(1)(C). Many cases have failed to find
an adverse effect. See, e.g., Zeller v. United States, 467 F. Supp. 487, 501-02 (E.D.N.Y.
1979); Harper v. United States, 423 F. Supp. 192, 196-97 (D.S.C. 1976).
The Privacy Act's standard for wilfullness is "somewhat greater" than gross negligence,
or, "an extreme departure from the standard of ordinary care." Doe v. General Services Ad-
ministration, 544 F. Supp. 530, 541 (D.Md. 1982); South v. FBI, 508 F. Supp. 1104, 1107
(N.D.Ill. 1981).
80. 700 F.2d 971 (5th Cir. 1983).
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ing to collect information, to the greatest extent practicable, directly
from the subject of a tax violation investigation. The court also re-
manded the matter for further findings of fact to determine appropri-
ate damages for mental anguish and physical injuries. This decision
appears to have limited application to a challenge of IRS computer
matching since the IRS has express authority under the law enforce-
ment exemption to gather information directly from other agencies'
data banks.
Injunctive relief under the Privacy Act is available only in in-
stances where a request to gain access to records or to amend records
has been denied.81 To redress other violations of the Privacy Act,
such as unauthorized interagency transfers of data, the data bank
subject is limited to filing a damages action. 81
d. Overall Ineffectiveness of the Privacy Act
Far from attaining the law's proclaimed purpose, the Privacy
Act has proven to be ineffective in protecting data bank subjects from
interagency transfers and disclosures of data. At the first Congres-
sional oversight hearing on the Privacy Act since its enactment in
1974, the House Subcommittee on Government Information, Justice
and Agriculture reviewed the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) implementation of the Privacy Act.83 During the hearings
the Subcommittee Chairman expressed dismay over the dearth of
OMB guidance to agencies in recent years, the failure to meet statu-
tory deadlines for reports to Congress, and the growing abuse of the
"routine use" exception in computer matching programs.8' Despite
these shortcomings, the OMB Director of Information and Regula-
tory Affairs asserted that "the Act is working well for the most
part," and stated that he did not "see any evidence [that application
of the routine use exemption] is running roughshod over the Privacy
Act." 8 The Director did, however, acknowledge the vagueness of
OMB's 1975 guidelines which require only a "programmatic nexus"
between the use of the data proposed by one agency and the original
reason asserted by another agency for collecting data from a
81. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
82. Edison v. Department of Army, 672 F.2d 840, 846 (11 th Cir. 1982); Parks v. IRS,
618 F.2d 677, 684 (10th Cir. 1980).
83. Oversight of the Privacy Act of 1974, Subcomm. on Gov't Information, Justice, and
Agriculture, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 98 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Oversight of Privacy Act].
84. Id. at 81-93 (statement by Glen English, Subcomm. Chairman).
85. Id. at 60-61, 118 (testimony by Christopher DeMuth, OMB Dir. of Information
and Regulation Affairs).
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subject.8 6
Earlier, in hearings before the Subcommittee on Oversight of
Government Management, a stark narrative of the ineffectiveness of
the Privacy Act was presented. 87 As compared to the 1979 OMB
guidelines on federal computer matching programs, the 1982 guide-
lines contain no requirements or limitations on computer matching
with regard to certain fundamental areas of concern. For instance,
all data bank information is subject to matching, no matter how per-
sonal or sensitive the material.8" The new guidelines do not require
that an agency assure due process of law to a data bank subject once
the computer match makes a "hit."8 9
Furthermore, agencies are no longer required to submit cost-
benefit analyses and reports for computer matching programs.9"
With such lax requirements, it is not surprising that OMB has ap-
proved every computer matching program since the inception of the
Privacy Act.91 For these reasons, one of the speakers at the hearings
stated that "it is difficult not to conclude that computer matching is a
totally unregulated business. .. 92 Consequently, the ineffectiveness
of the Privacy Act leaves the fourth amendment as the sole potential
protection against IRS data bank searches.
IV. FOURTH AMENDMENT SEARCH AND SEIZURE PROTECTIONS
In the absence of effective legislative protections, and given the
uncertainty of other constitutional protections available to data bank
subjects, the fourth amendment may be the last source of protection
against IRS computer data bank searches. The fourth amendment
has long served as a protective device against overambitious law en-
forcement.9" The Supreme Court, in G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United
86. Id. at 90, 94.
87. Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Oversight of Government Management, 97th
Cong., 1st Sess. 21, 273 (1982) (presentation by K.S. Swendiman) [hereinafter cited as Over-
sight of Government Management].
88. Id. at 275-76.
89. Id. at 247. Office of Management and Budget guidelines for the Privacy Act of 1974
define a computer "hit" as "the identification, through a matching program, of a specific indi-
vidual." 47 Fed. Reg. 21,657, § 4(f) (1982).
90. Oversight of Government Management, supra note 87, at 113.
91. Oversight of the Privacy Act, supra note 83, at 113.
92. Oversight of Government Management, supra note 87, at 81 (presentation of J.
Shattuck, ACLU Legislative Director).
93. "Where Congress has authorized [government] inspection [of personal records] but
made no rules governing the procedure that inspectors must follow, the Fourth Amendment
and its various restrictive rules apply." Colonade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S.
72, 77 (1970); See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 543-46 (1967); United States v. Deak-
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States,94 declared that ". .one of the primary evils intended to be
eliminated by the Fourth Amendment was the massive intrusion on
privacy undertaken in the collection of taxes [during colonial times]
pursuant to general warrants and writs of assistance." 95 The Inter-
nal Revenue Service in the furtherance of tax enforcement is not li-
censed to disregard the fourth amendment."
Modern day matching of computer data banks by the IRS in
the hope of finding a tax violator may very well constitute a general
search in contravention of the fourth amendment. 97 Since the pri-
mary purpose of the fourth amendment is to protect personal privacy
and dignity against unwarranted government intrusion, 8 IRS com-
puter matching of data banks arguably violates one of the fundamen-
tal rights of a free society. To invoke protection of the fourth amend-
ment search and seizure clause, the victim must establish that the
government unreasonably intruded upon matters over which the vic-
tim has a reasonable expectation of privacy."'
A. Expectations of Privacy in Private Data Banks
The fourth amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and
seizures, and requires that a warrant be based upon probable cause,
Perera & Co., 566 F. Supp. 1398, 1402 (D.D.C. 1983).
The fourth amendment to the Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no War-
rants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized.
U.S. CONST. AMEND. IV.
94. 429 U.S. 338 (1977). In G.M. Leasing Corp., in order to satisfy a tax assessment
against a taxpayer, IRS agents made warrantless searches and seizures of the taxpayer's
records and documents, along with his levied automobiles. The Court held that intrusions into
taxpayer's privacy without a warrant for the purpose of collecting taxes violated the fourth
amendment. 429 U.S. 338.
95. Id. at 355 (citing T. TAYLOR, Two Studies in Constitutional Interpretation 35-41
(1969); N. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 51-78 (1937); J. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE
AND THF SUPREME COURT 30-42 (1966)). One of the early causes of the American Revolution
was disdain for general writs of assistance. Cave v. Superior Court, 267 Cal. App. 2d 517,
521, 73 Cal. Rptr. 167, 170 (1968). During Colonial times, a writ of assistance specified only
the object of the search-goods on which colonists had evaded paying taxes. With carte blanche
authority, British customs officials were "completely free to search any place where they be-
lieved such goods might be." Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 220 (1981).
96. 429 U.S. at 355.
97. See infra notes 155-170 and accompanying text.
98. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966).
99. See infra notes 102-108 and accompanying text.
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particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized." ° A search in the context of the fourth amend-
ment is defined as an exploratory investigation, quest, or invasion
into places either concealed or intended to be private.10" Thus, a
search encompasses governmental intrusions into matters over which
one has a justifiable expectation of privacy. 02 Intrusion into, or ob-
servation of that which a person knowingly exposes to the public,
even in his own home or office, is not a search. However, intrusion
into what a person seeks to preserve as private, even in an area open
to the public, may be a search subject to restrictions by the fourth
amendment.10
The "subjective expectation of privacy" test is a two-prong test
set forth in Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in Katz v. United
States:'0 4 "[F]irst . . . a person [must] have an actual (subjective)
expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that
society is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.' "105 Recently, the
second prong of the Katz test has been the focus of the Court's anal-
ysis.'0 The objectivity element of the second prong attempts to bal-
ance the individual's interest in conducting his affairs in private
against the public's interest in thwarting criminal activity by inten-
sive investigation.'07 Despite repeated protests by dissenting Supreme
Court justices, this test does not recognize an absolute immunity
from searches of highly personal matters.' 8
100. U.S. CONST. AMEND. IV. See supra note 93.
It is generally assumed that whatever constitutes a "search" necessitates a warrant. 2 W.
LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 4.1 (1978).
101. Brown v. State, 372 P.2d 785, 790 (Alaska 1962); People v. Holloway, 230 Cal.
App. 2d 834, 839, 41 Cal. Rptr. 325, 328 (1964).
An administrative investigation into books and records constitutes a "search" within the
meaning of the fourth amendment. See Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 598 (1981); See v.
City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 544 (1967); Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327
U.S. 186, 195 (1945); State Fair of Texas v. United States Consumer Product Safety Comm'n,
650 F.2d 1324, 1327 (5th Cir. 1981).
102. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
103. Id. at 351-52.
104. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). The majority opinion, authored by Justice
Stewart, does not refer to a subjective analysis. It states that the government conduct directed
at Katz "violated the privacy upon which he justifiably relied." Id. at 353.
105. Id. at 361.
106. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) ("wherever an individual may harbor a reasona-
ble 'expectation of privacy' . . . he is entitled to be free from unreasonable governmental in-
trusion."); Vreeken v. Davis, 718 F.2d 343, 347 (10th Cir. 1983).
107. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of Press v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 593 F.2d
1030, 1042-43 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
108. Justice Douglas, dissenting in Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967), asserted
that the Constitution "creates a zone of privacy that may not be invaded by the police through
19851
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Traditionally, the Supreme Court has limited an individual's
"constitutionally protected areas" 10 9 to those enumerated in the
fourth amendment: persons," 0 houses,' papers,"' and personal ef-
fects. "' In Katz, it appeared that the Supreme Court was prepared
to extend an individual's zone of privacy beyond traditional limits." 4
More recently, though, the Court has favored "effective law enforce-
ment," indicating that one's zone of privacy does not insulate all per-
sonal activities and possessions."' Today, no clear rule exists as to
what constitutes a "reasonable expectation of privacy." The United
States Supreme Court has yet to rule on the applicability of the
fourth amendment to computer data bank searches.
In the area of personal banking records, the Supreme Court
held in United States v. Miller"6 that a defendant had no justified
expectation of privacy in his financial records held by his bank since
his records were not "private papers. 11 7 The Court found the de-
raids, by the legislature through laws, or by magistrates through the issuance of warrants." Id.
at 313.
"Diaries and personal letters that record only their author's personal thoughts lie at the
heart of our sense of privacy." Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 350 (1973) (Marshall,
J., dissenting).
109. Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 510 (1961).
110. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767-68 (1966) (a person's body); Beck v.
Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 90 (1966) (a person's clothing).
11. See, e.g., Clinton v. Virginia, 377 U.S. 158 (1964) (apartment); Stoner v. Califor-
nia, 376 U.S. 483 (1964) (hotel room); Taylor v. United States, 286 U.S. 1 (1932) (garage);
United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452 (1932) (business office).
112. Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 735 (1878) (letters).
113. Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 367 (1964) (automobile).
114. 389 U.S. 347. In Katz, the Supreme Court extended privacy protections to tele-
phone conversations placed in a public telephone booth tapped by a government eavesdropping
device.
115. See, e.g., California v. Carney, 53 U.S.L.W. 4521, 4523 (May 13, 1985) (warrant-
less search of motor home not violative of fourth amendment because of reduced expectation of
privacy stemming from pervasive regulation of such vehicles capable of traveling on highways);
United States v. Place, 103 S. Ct. 2637, 2644 (1983) (exposure of traveler's luggage in an
airport to a narcotics detection dog does not constitute a search because the luggage owner "is
not subjected to the embarrassment and inconvenience entailed in less discriminate and more
intrusive investigative methods.").
116. 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
117. Id. at 442. The Court relied on California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21(1974), which upheld the constitutionality of the Bank Secrecy Act (the Act). The Act is a
misnomer of legislation, enacted for the purpose of requiring banks to keep microfilmed copies
of depositors' banking transactions for the convenience of IRS criminal investigations of tax
evasion.
The Court held that the Act did not violate the fourth amendment since the bank was
only required to maintain copies of depositors' records, and not required to disclose the records
to the government. The government would need a subpoena to gain access to the records. The
American Civil Liberties Union, a joint plaintiff, alleged that the Act was unconstitutional
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fendant to have no legitimate expectation of privacy because the
bank checks were negotiable instruments used in commerce, and be-
cause the documents contained information voluntarily conveyed to
the banks and exposed to their employees in the ordinary course of
business. The Court concluded that copies of defendant's checks, de-
posit slips, financial statements and monthly- statements were the
business records of the bank, thus conveying property rights to the
bank, not to the defendant bank customer. 18
Despite the doctrinal basis of Katz which abandoned the notion
of property rights as a necessary element of privacy, 119 the Miller
court asserted that an individual with "neither ownership nor pos-
session"0 in his records has no protected fourth amendment inter-
est. This conclusion is contrary to the reasoning of Katz and Jones v.
United States,121 which "explicitly did away with the requirement
that to establish standing one must show legal possession or owner-
ship of the searched premises... ""' Furthermore, the Court's pre-
supposition that the banking customer consented to the search be-
cause he assumed the risk of disclosure by the bank to government
authorities conflicts with the Court's earlier decisions in Bumper v.
North Carolina,123 and Mancusi v. DeForte. 1"
because it did not provide notice to depositors upon issuance of a subpoena for records. The
Court dispelled this argument on the grounds that plaintiff was prematurely asserting an in-
jury when the Service had yet to subpoena its records from the bank. Although that issue was
left unresolved, the Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978 later corrected this infirmity. See
infra note 127 and accompanying text.
118. 425 U.S. at 440.
119. "Katz v. United States (389 U.S. 347] makes it clear that capacity to claim the
protection of the [fourth] Amendment depends not upon a property right in the invaded place
but upon whether the area was one in which there was a reasonable expectation of freedom
from governmental intrusion." Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 368 (1968).
120. 425 U.S. at 440.
121. 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
122. Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. at 369, construed in Jones v. United States, 362
U.S. 257 (1960).
123. 391 U.S. 543 (1968). In Bumper, the Court recognized that although a third per-
son may own and possess the incriminating material being sought, the search victim is never-
theless entitled to fourth amendment protections for the reason that the victim is the "one
against whom the search [is] directed." 391 U.S. at 548, quoting Jones v. United States, 362
U.S. at 261. Therefore, even though the search victim in Bumper may have assumed the risk
that his grandmother would consent to a search of her home for the alleged murder weapon (a
rifle which the grandmother owned), the search victim retained standing to challenge the valid-
ity of the search. 391 U.S. at 548.
124. 392 U.S. 364 (1968). In Mancusi the Court held that plaintiff, by voluntarily
exposing his books and records to other occupants of his office, did not thereby grant consent to
a search of such materials by state officials. Plaintiff held a reasonable expectation of privacy
in the books and records despite the fact that the materials were subject to scrutiny by co-
occupants of plaintiff's shared office space.
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Nevertheless, the facts in Miller are distinguishable from the
circumstances surrounding an IRS computer search. Miller involved
a search of defendant's checks voluntarily placed into the public
stream of commerce, whereas an IRS computer search of taxpayer
information retained by government agencies involves a search of in-
formation obtained by the government through compulsion."' 5 Most
information held by government agencies is demanded in exchange
for licenses and benefits, the denial of which would frustrate a citi-
zen's ability to function in today's society.
The Miller Court acknowledged this distinction between ob-
taining information by compulsion, and by free will. However,
rather than finding the distinction persuasive, the Court instead pro-
ceeded to distinguish Burrows v. Superior Court ,. a California Su-
preme Court case which held that the defendant had a reasonable
expectation of privacy in his bank records worthy of fourth amend-
ment protection against searches without legal process. 117
125. Compulsory production of one's books and records to be used in a criminal or
penal proceeding is restricted by the fourth amendment. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616(1886). See also Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767-68 (1966) (compulsory produc-
tion of blood sample for testing of alcoholic content restricted by fourth amendment
considerations).
126. 13 Cal. 3d 238, 529 P.2d 590, 118 Cal. Rptr. 166 (1974) (bank records obtained
by sheriff and prosecutor without legal process but with consent of a bank was held an illegal
search and seizure), cited in Miller, 425 U.S. at 445 n.7.
127. 13 Cal. 3d at 247, 529 P.2d at 596, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 172.
Justice Mosk of the California Supreme Court advised:
To permit a police officer access to these records merely upon his request,
without any judicial control as to relevancy or other traditional requirements of
legal process, and to allow the evidence to be used in any subsequent criminal
prosecution against a defendant, opens the door to a vast and unlimited range of
very real abuses of police power.
Id. at 247, 529 P.2d at 596, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 172.
The holding in Miller has met sharp criticism from other state supreme courts, e.g.,
Charnes v. DiGiacomo, 200 Colo. 94, 612 P.2d 1117 (1980); Commonwealth v. DeJohn, 486
Pa. 32, 403 A.2d 1283 (1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1032 (1980); and commentators, e.g. 1
W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, § 2.7 (1978 & Supp. 1984); Pen Registers After Smith v.
Maryland, 15 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 753 (1980); Fishman, Pen Registers and Privacy:
Risks, Expectations, and the Nullification of Congressional Intent, 29 CATH. U.L. REV. 557
(1979-80).
Justice Brennan, in full agreement with the California Supreme Court analysis, asserted
in his dissent in Miller that lack of notice to a bank customer upon disclosure of his records to
the government was a "fatal constitutional defect" to fourth amendment rights. 425 U.S. at
448 n.2. Interestingly, Congress subsequently enacted the Right to Financial Privacy Act of
1978, 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401-22 (1982) which require that a copy of any federal subpoena or
summons for financial records be served on the customer with full notice of his right to chal-
lenge the subpoena or summons in court prior to its execution 10 days hence, unless a "protec-
tive order" is obtained upon a showing that such notice would jeopardize the investigation.
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In Smith v. Maryland, 128 a case involving the government's use
of a "pen register"12 9 to record the numbers dialed from an individ-
ual's telephone, the United States Supreme Court held that an indi-
vidual has no legitimate expectation of privacy in his telephone
records.' 80 As in Miller, the Court based its decision on the theory
that defendant telephone subscriber voluntarily conveyed the dialing
numbers to the telephone company in the ordinary course of busi-
ness, thereby implicitly consenting to interception by the government
pen register.' 31
When the California Supreme Court was faced with nearly the
same facts in People v. Blair,3 2 it held contrary to the United States
Supreme Court based upon its interpretation of the California Con-
stitution - that an individual does have a reasonable expectation of
privacy in his telephone records. Unlike the Smith Court's contention
that telephone subscribers assume the risk that the telephone com-
pany will automatically reveal telephone records to police, Justice
Mosk of the California Supreme Court expressed the belief that tele-
phone subscribers justifiably expect that use of their records will be
limited to necessary internal telephone company accounting func-
tions. ' Likewise, the New Jersey Supreme Court refuted the Smith
rationale, and instead interpreted the New Jersey Constitution in
State v. Hunt "' in a manner consistent with the California Su-
128. 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
129. A pen register is an electronic device attached to a telephone line which intercepts
telephone calls and records the numbers dialed. See I W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE §
2.7(b) (1978).
130. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. at 742.
131. 442 U.S. at 743. The Court explained:
Telephone users, in sum, typically know that they must convey numerical infor-
mation to the phone company; that the phone company has facilities for record-
ing this information; and that the phone company does in fact record this infor-
mation for a variety of legitimate business purposes. Although subjective
expectations cannot be scientifically gauged, it is too much to believe that tele-
phone subscribers, under these circumstances, harbor any general expectation
that the numbers they dial will remain secret.
Id.
132. 25 Cal. 3d 640, 602 P.2d 738, 159 Cal. Rptr. 818 (1979).
133. 25 Cal. 3d at 653, 602 P.2d at 746, 159 Cal. Rptr. at 826.
134. State v. Hunt, 91 N.J. 338, 450 A.2d 952 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1982) (telephone toll
billing records seized without judicial sanction or proceeding). Despite the court's recognition
of prior Supreme Court decisions disallowing fourth amendment protections for telephone toll
records, Justice Scheiber of the New Jersey Supreme Court nonetheless asserted:
The telephone caller is entitled to assume that the words he utters into the
mouthpiece will not be broadcast to the world. [Katz v. United States,] 389 U.S.
at 352 (1967). Similarly, he is entitled to assume that the numbers he dials in
the privacy of his home will be recorded solely for the telephone company's
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preme Court's reasoning in Blair.
The California Constitution... and the New Jersey Constitu-
tion136 contain language virtually identical to that found in the
fourth amendment. Yet the divergence of opinions between Smith, on
the one hand, and Blair and Hunt on the other, suggests that the
United States Supreme Court is granting greater deference to law
enforcement than are state courts. The divergence of opinions ap-
pears most acute in cases involving searches which employ contem-
porary technology.
While the United States Supreme Court denies an expectation
of privacy once the information or records leave the hands or lips of
the individual, the state forums maintain that privacy rights continue
to exist beyond the point of collection of information by the third
party. The state courts imply societal expectations of privacy de-
manding third party recipients to adhere to a fiduciary duty respect-
ing the confidentiality of the information obtained. The United
States Supreme Court, on the other hand, asserts that privacy expec-
tations end because the defendant has assumed the risk that informa-
tion revealed to third parties will be transferred to others.'3 7
The United States Supreme Court finds solace in believing that
the individual has the option whether or not to release information
through conduits of communication and channels of commerce. For
example, the Smith court draws no distinction between impairment
to privacy when personally dialing telephone calls and when placing
calls through an operator. Positing that central computer switching
equipment for telephone operations is the modern counterpart of op-
erators, the Smith court dismissed defendant's claim that the comput-
erized equipment actually assures a greater expectation of privacy.
Yet computers do assure greater privacy protection if guarantees ex-
ist to prevent government officials from tapping into the data banks.
Computer data banks theoretically serve to enhance data pri-
business purposes.
Id. at 346-47, 450 A.2d at 956.
135. "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable seizures and searches, shall not be violated. CAL. CONST. art. I, §
13.
136. "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue
except upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched and the papers and things to be seized." N.J. CONST. art. I, par. 7.
137. The lack of protections availed by federal law suggests that a complaint couched in
terms of state law assures greater chances of obtaining protection. See, e.g., Pruneyard Shop-
ping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980) (California Constitution conferring greater rights
and protections than United States Constitution).
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vacy by confining the information to densely packed electromagnetic
files; access to the files is restricted to those persons having a valid
password. With a computer, there is no need for human contact
with specific data except at the initial stage of inputting it into the
system. " 8 Thereafter, the data in each file retains anonymity until
matched with identifying names or numbers in association with an
individual, or when retrieved for viewing upon a screen or printer.
Nevertheless, if mismanaged or abused, computer data banks pose a
serious threat to privacy. 39
The ability to electromagnetically search or sort through mas-
sive arrays of data files is a distinctive feature of computers.140 When
a computer search becomes a dragnet combing through data files to
match incriminating evidence, the technological advantage of com-
puters seriously impinges on legitimate expectations of privacy. "
B. Expectations of Privacy in Government Data Banks
Statutory restrictions, custom and private remedies serve to cre-
ate or reinforce societal expectations of privacy. " " Notwithstanding
138. For the purpose of securing the privacy of tax return information held on all indi-
viduals by the IRS, only IRS personnel with personal passwords may review the files of tax
information on IRS data banks. The amount of information available for perusal varies with
the level of entry authorized. The security system also monitors on a daily basis all individuals
who have accessed data. COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY AT IRS, supra note 3, at 54-55.
The cursory nature of governmental handling of individual records provides government
employees with little opportunity to inspect the personal data. The tremendous volume of
records simply does not physically permit it. Therefore, government contact with the informa-
tion during the inputting stage is minimal.
139.
To be sure, the Constitution and Bill of Rights are not to be read as covering
only the technology known in the 18th century. Otherwise its concept of "com-
merce" would be hopeless when it comes to the management of modern affairs.
At the same time the concepts of privacy which the Founders enshrined in the
Fourth Amendment vanish completely when we slavishly allow an all-powerful
government, proclaiming law and order, efficiency, and other benign purposes,
to penetrate all the walls and doors which men need to shield them from the
pressures of a turbulent life around them and give them the health and strength
to carry on.
United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 756 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
140. With the advent of telecommunications, data files can be dispursed or published in
a matter of seconds throughout the world. See generally COMPUTER-BASED NATIONAL IN-
FORMATION SYSTEMS, supra note 6, at 137-38.
141. "The computer storage and easy accessibility of computerized data vastly increases
the potential for abuse of that information, and I am not prepared to say that future develop-
ments will not demonstrate the necessity of some curb on such technology." Whalen v. Roe,
429 U.S. 589, 609 (1977) (Brennan, J. concurring).
142. "Our expectations, and the risks we assume, are in large part reflections of laws
that translate into rules the customs and values of the past and present." United States v.
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the fact that the Privacy Act of 1974 and other legislation fail to
safeguard privacy interests in government maintained data banks,148
the purported purpose of the legislation does serve to raise expecta-
tions of statutory protection over privacy interests in such data.1 44
But for poor drafting by Congress and incompetent oversight and
regulation by the Office of Management and Budget, the Privacy Act
would have extended some degree of protection against IRS com-
puter data bank searches. Legitimate societal expectations of privacy
simply should not be compromised by infirm legislation.
The Freedom of Information Act (the FOIA),1"" unlike the Pri-
vacy Act, was enacted to facilitate the release of information from the
White, 407 U.S. 745, 786 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting). See, e.g., Omnibus Crime Control
and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Title III, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197 (codified at 18
U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520) (protecting the privacy of wire and oral communications). Congress
intended that the prohibition against wiretapping and electronic surveillance, codified by 18
U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520, should be as pervasive as the fourth amendment protections guaranteed
in Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967) and Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 2, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 2112, 2113. Cf United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 732 n.4 (1979) (rejecting defen-
dant's assertion that Bahamian bank secrecy laws created a reasonable expectation of privacy
in his Bahamian bank records).
143. See supra notes 59-92 and accompanying discussion of the Privacy Act of 1974.
For other legislation dealing with privacy protection, see Freedom of Information Act of 1966,
5 U.S.C. § 552 (1982); Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974, 20 U.S.C. §
1232g (1982); Right to Financial Privacy Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401-22 (1982); Privacy Protec-
tion Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000aa, 2000aa-5 to 2000aa-7, 2000aa-1 1, 2000aa-12 (1982);
Electronic Funds Transfer Act of 1980, 15 U.S.C. 1693 (1982).
144. The Tax Reform Act of 1976 extends some privacy protection to data held on
individuals by the Internal Revenue Service. The Act reverses the former status of non-confi-
dentiality of individual tax returns and return information. Formerly the law stated that tax
returns were public, with certain exceptions. Under the Tax Reform Act, returns are confiden-
tial, with certain exceptions. Returns may be disclosed with the consent of the taxpayer, upon
written request of state tax authorities or estate administrator, to committees of Congress, to
the Dep't. of Justice or Treasury for tax investigations, for statistical surveys and to locate
parents failing to meet their child support obligations. I.R.C. § 6103.
In Rodgers v. United States, 697 F.2d 899, 906 (10th Cir. 1983), even though the tax-
payer in litigating issues in his tax return caused the return to become a matter of public
record, the court held that an IRS agent's disclosure to a third person of the tax information in
the return was unlawful. The IRS agent argued that there can be no reasonable expectation of
privacy with respect to matters of public record. The court disagreed, but on different grounds,
stating that "[t]he issue . . . [does not involve] the loss of 'confidentiality' or 'privacy,' but,
rather, . . . [the existence of] an unauthorized disclosure of tax return information in violation
of § 6103. . . . Even assuming the loss of confidentiality in the context of the statements, we
hold that the . . . disclosure was clearly unauthorized." 697 F.2d at 906. However, the court
failed to recognize that, in enacting I.R.C. § 6103, Congress placed great weight on the impor-
tance of preserving expectations of privacy and confidentiality in tax return information. See
H.R. REP. No. 658, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 316-17, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 2897, 3746-47.
145. 5 U.S.C. § 552.
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government.146 Equally important, though, the FOIA contains nine
prohibitions against disclosure of government-maintained informa-
tion, the most significant prohibition being the non-disclosure of
"personnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which
would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal pri-
vacy."14  The FOIA recognizes that society demands a certain degree
of privacy protection in government-maintained data banks. 8 Fur-
thermore, the FOIA clearly acknowledges that privacy rights remain
affixed to personal data files even after the government comes into
possession of the data.' 4  The Supreme Court likewise acknowledged
the personal nature of private information held by the government
and exempted under the FOIA.18
In United States v. Deak-Perera & Co.,151 the District of Co-
lumbia district court held that a general sharing of information con-
cerning a taxpayer, even if shared intra-agency, is prohibited if it
would violate the subject's legitimate expectation of privacy. Simi-
larly, in United States v. Sells Engineering, Inc.,1"' the Supreme
Court held that in the absence of a court order the Department of
Justice may not transfer grand jury materials from its criminal to its
civil division. The Court sought to protect the legitimate expectation
of privacy in testimony compelled from witnesses, and to quell fears
that the testimony would be used in other governmental civil litiga-
tion and administrative actions.185 Based on these statutorily and ju-
146. The Freedom of Information Act was broadly conceived "to permit access to offi-
cial information long shielded unnecessarily from public view. . . ." EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S.
73, 80 (1973). The legislative history of the FOIA indicates a congressional intent to reflect "a
general philosophy of full agency disclosure unless information is exempted under clearly de-
lineated statutory language..." S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1965) [hereinafter
cited as S. REP. No. 813].
147. Exemption 6 of the FOIA, § 552(b)(6).
148. S. REP. No. 813, supra note 146, at 9.
149. "The primary thrusts of [the Senate and House FOIA Reports] emphasize that
Exemption 6 was intended as a general exemption to protect the privacy rights of individuals
who, for one reason or another, are required to submit personal information to the govern-
ment." Pacific Molasses Co. v. NLRB, 577 F.2d 1172, 1179 (5th Cir. 1978).
150. Department of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352 (1976). The District of Columbia
Circuit held that the FOIA's exemption for personnel, medical and similar files covers all
information applying to a particular individual, regardless of the type of file in which the
information is contained. Washington Post Co. v. United States Dep't. of Health and Human
Services, 690 F.2d 252 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
151. 566 F. Supp. 1398 (D.D.C. 1983).
152. 103 S. Ct. 3133 (1983). Cf United States v. Procter & Gamble, 356 U.S. 677
(1958) (defendant must show good cause for discovery and production of grand jury transcripts
arising from defunct criminal proceeding against defendant and being used by government in
civil action against same defendant).
153. As the Sells Engineering court stated, disclosure of information from one agency to
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dicially created expectations of privacy, an individual may assert a
legitimate expectation of privacy in government-maintained files con-
taining personal information, and thereby challenge the validity of
the computer data bank search as a general search unsupported by
probable cause in violation of the fourth amendment." 4
C. General Searches
Computer matching of data banks by the IRS exhibit many of
the indicia of a general exploratory search typical of general writs of
assistance prohibited by the fourth amendment. 55 Dreading general
writs of assistance which invaded the privacy of American colonists,
the Constitution's framers drafted the fourth amendment with the
intention of preventing overambitious government officials from
searching and seizing what they might please." 6'
In order to limit the scope of a search and to verify its lawful-
ness, the fourth amendment requires that a magistrate issue a war-
rant upon oath or affidavit of an officer particularly describing the
person or place to be searched.'8 7 Full-blown searches, dragnets,
wholesale rummaging through possessions, or "fishing expeditions"
in search of potential evidence are prohibited by the fourth amend-
ment; such exploratory searches cannot be undertaken by the govern-
another would "threat[en] the willingness of witnesses to come forward and to testify fully and
candidly. If a witness knows or fears that his testimony before the grand jury will be routinely
available for use in governmental civil litigation or administrative actions, he may well be less
willing to speak for fear that he will get himself into trouble in some other forum." 103 S. Ct.
at 3142.
The Court also expressed its concern for the unfair advantage the government would gain
by obtaining access to private materials, stating that "the limitations imposed on investigation
and discovery exist for sound reasons-ranging from fundamental fairness to concern about
burdensomeness and intrusiveness." 103 S. Ct. at 3142-43.
154. Recent polls reflect an increasing societal concern over privacy of data banks and
expectations of restraints on use of government and private data banks. COMPUTER-BASED
NATIONAL INFORMATION SYSTEMS, supra note 6, at 78, (citing The Dimensions of Privacy:
A National Opinion Research Survey of Attitudes Toward Privacy (1979)).
See infra notes 155-170 and accompanying text for an analysis of general searches and
notes 171-190 and accompanying text for an analysis of probable cause.
155. Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476 (1965); Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192(1927); Gurleski v. United States, 405 F.2d 253 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 977
(1969).
156. Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476. Justice Stewart, concurring in Stanley v. Georgia,
394 U.S. 557 (1969), stated that: "The purpose of [the fourth amendment] was to guarantee to
the people of this Nation that they should forever be secure from the general searches and
unrestrained seizures that had been a hated hallmark of colonial rule under the notorious writs
of assistance of the British Crown." 394 U.S. at 569 (quoting Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. at
481).
157. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; FED. R. CRIM. PROC. 41(c).
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ment with or without a warrant. " Likewise, it is arguable that a
generalized search through computer data banks constitutes a mas-
sive dragnet into the private affairs of substantial numbers of
persons.
Search techniques which indiscriminately pry into :society's
zones of privacy are inherently unlawful unless restricted to narrow
applications." For example, trained narcotics-detecting police dogs,
if used indiscriminately, represent an invasion of one's expectation of
privacy. 60 Similarly, 'wholesale frisking' of the general public with
magnetic scanners in order to locate weapons and to prevent future
crimes is not justified. 61 Random detentive searches of large num-
bers of persons without objective facts giving rise to a suspicion of
illegality are impermissible,"' unless an officer can point to an indi-
vidualized, articulable suspicion of the persons searched. 6
An unlimited search of all of an individual's personal financial
records held by a third party is impermissible.'" Indeed, the Su-
preme Court's decision in United States v. Miller justified, :in part,
the search and seizure of a depositor's financial records held by a
bank on grounds that the Government had exercised its investigative
powers under the legal restraints of a narrowly defined subpoena
duces tecum 65 Had the search in Miller been a general search
through all records, the requirements of the administrative sum-
mons 66-the typical IRS procedure for obtaining information con-
cerning a taxpayer-would not have been satisfied." 7 It would only
158. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 62 (1950); United States v. Rettig, 589
F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1978).
159. Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927); VonderAHE v. Howland, 508 F.2d
364 (9th Cir. 1974).
160. "The increasing use of dogs, in airports and elsewhere, to detect contraband exem-
plifies the 'powerful hydraulic pressures' to 'water down constitutional guarantees.' " United
States v. Beale, 674 F.2d 1327, 1331 n.5 (9th Cir. 1982) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1
(1968) (Douglas, J., dissenting)), rev'd on remand, 736 F.2d 1289 (1984), in light of, United
States v. Place, 103 S. Ct. 2637, 2644 (1983) (holding that a search does not oa.cur when
travelers' luggage in an airport is sniffed by a narcotics detection dog).
161. United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 908 (9th Cir. 1973). "There is an obvious
danger ...that the screening of passengers and explosives will be subverted into a general
search for evidence of crime." 482 F.2d at 909.
162. International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union v. Sureck, 681 F.2d 624, 639 (9th
Cir. 1982).
163. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979); United States v. Heredia-Castillo, 616
F.2d 1147 (9th Cir. 1980).
164. United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48 (1964).
165. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. at 446 n.6.
166. I.R.C. § 7602-09 (1982).
167. Baldwin v. C.I.R., 648 F.2d 483, 488 (8th Cir. 1981) ("overbroad IRS informa-
tional probe may infringe upon constitutionally protected rights"); United States v. Life Si-
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seem reasonable to expect that since legislatively prescribed adminis-
trative summonses must be limited in scope to relevant materials, an
IRS computer search of data banks should likewise be limited in
scope to less than a general search.
Administrative summons procedures also require that the data
subject receive notice within three days of the issuance of the sum-
mons to a third-party record-keeper.168 Conversely, a data bank sub-
ject receives no notice of IRS computer data bank searches. Under
the Privacy Act,"' an agency is required to publish in the federal
register the scope and use of data banks; however, the federal regis-
ter notice requirement does not apply to criminal law enforcement
searches.170 Therefore, IRS computer searches, lacking the specificity
of a warrant or notice, proceed under the guise of criminal investiga-
tion unrestrained by legal process. Without satisfying the restrictions
of the fourth amendment, the IRS is at liberty to conduct a full-
blown search of data banks-from A to Z, numbers 1 to
2 50,000,000-to discover any possible evidence of wrongdoing. This
is clearly a general search.
D. Probable Cause
A general search by computer is instituted in the absence of any
pre-existing evidence to justify suspicion of wrongdoing by the data
bank subjects.17 1 Since a general search by computer is not even pre-
mised on "mere suspicion, ' '1 72 the fourth amendment requirement of
probable cause is not met. The fourth amendment requires that
searches intruding upon an individual's privacy be justified by prob-
able cause, as determined by a neutral and detached magistrate.' 7 1 If
probable cause is found, then the warrant must particularize the
items sought so as to prevent a general search.' 74
Probable cause for a search exists when known facts and cir-
cumstances are sufficient to warrant a reasonably prudent person to
ences Church, 636 F.2d 221 (8th Cir. 1980) (per curiam) (infringement upon first amendment
rights).
168. I.R.C. § 7609(a).
169. See supra note 65.
170. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(j). See also supra note 68.
171. See, e.g., Jaffess v. Secretary of HEW, 393 F. Supp. 626 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
172. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176-77 (1949) (probable cause for a
search warrant requires "less than evidence which would justify ...conviction," yet "more
than mere suspicion.").
173. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467 (1971); Johnson v. United States,
333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948); United States v. Heldt, 668 F.2d 1238 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
174. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. at 467.
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believe that criminally-related objects or incriminating evidence will
be found in the place which the warrant authorizes to be searched.
175
The actual level of proof required is subject to dispute and difficult
to quantify. A significantly lower quanta of proof is required to es-
tablish probable cause than guilt;1 76 nevertheless, there must be some
objective facts to raise suspicions that criminal activity is occur-
ring.177 Mere suspicion or expectation that an item may incriminate
a defendant is not sufficient.1 7
5
Courts typically analyze probable cause in terms of weighing
the need to search against the invasion of privacy.179 In practical
application, though, courts more typically deal with probable cause
in terms of probabilities-that it was more probable than not that a
certain person committed an offense.'"
The probability that one among many data bank subjects is vio-
lating the internal revenue laws is so remote, at least on a s:tatistical
basis, that probable cause is not satisfied. 81 Yet when dealing with
over two hundred million potential suspects, the only sensible way to
analyze probable cause appears to be on a statistical basis. The IRS
reports that the noncompliance rate for persons not voluntarily re-
175. Zucher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 556-57 n.6 (1978) (citing wi:h approval
Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. (1974)).
176. United States v. Davis, 458 F.2d 819, 821 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (the standard of prob-
able cause required to arrest). It appears that the quanta of evidence required for a search is
the same as that for an arrest. See Zucher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 557 n.6 (citing with
approval Comment, 28 U. CHI. L. REV. 664, 687 (1961)).
177. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417 (1981) (the standard of probable cause
required for an investigatory stop); International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union v. Sureck,
681 F.2d at 635.
178. United States v. Dichiarinte, 445 F.2d 126, 129 n.2 (7th Cir. 1971).
179. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967). "[T]he gravity of the suspected
crime ...bears] on the validity of the search or arrest." United States v. Soyka, 394 F.2d
443 (2d Cir. 1968) (Friendly, J., dissenting on original decision overturned on rehearing). See
also Barrett, Personal Rights, Property Rights and the Fourth Amendment, 1960 Sup. CT.
REV. 46, 63.
The more intrusive and insulting the search, the greater must be the probability that the
search will be fruitful. United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 731 F.2d 1369, 1370 (9th
Cir. 1984), cert. granted, 105 S. Ct. 954 (1985). A full body (cavity) search requires a "clear
indication," Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 769-70 (1966), or a "plain suggestion,"
Rivas v. United States, 368 F.2d 703, 710 (9th Cir. 1966), whereas a strip body search re-
quires a "real suspicion" of criminal activity. United States v. Guadalupe-Garza, 421 F.2d
876, 879 (9th Cir. 1970).
180. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. at 175 ("In dealing with probable cause ...
as the very name implies, we deal with probabilities."); Illinois v. Gates, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2328
(1983).
181. See generally Coates, supra note 2; IRS NON-COMPLIANCE STUDY, supra note
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porting income is about ten percent."' Of the roughly two hundred
million persons listed as subjects in agency data banks, the noncom-
pliers would represent five to eight percent. Therefore, the optimum
"hit" rate, or probability of identifying a tax evader through com-
puter searches, is at best eight percent, or less than one in ten. It
would seem fallacious to conclude that it is more probable than not
that each data bank subject is violating the internal revenue laws.1 83
With respect to whether any crime has in fact occurred, courts
typically require a higher level of probability for identifying un-
known criminal activity than for identifying specific perpetrators of
known criminal activity. 1" This position is justifiable since the lim-
ited activity of identifying the perpetrator of a known criminal of-
fense is far less offensive to expectations of privacy than is the opera-
tion of attempting to identify a suspected yet unknown criminal
offense; the latter is the function of IRS computer data bank
searches.
Under conventional methods of identifying unknown perpetra-
tors of suspected unlawful activity, the IRS must abide by the re-
quirements of a "John Doe" summons. 85 The IRS may serve a
John Doe summons only if it can prove in an ex parte petition to a
district court judge that:
(1) the summons relates to the investigation of a particular per-
son or ascertainable group or class; (2) that there is a reasona-
ble basis for believing that the person or group may fail or has
failed to comply with a tax law; and (3) that the information
sought, as well as the identity of the person or persons to which
the information relates, is not readily available from other
sources. 1"6
The stringent requirements of a "John Doe" summons are intended
to prevent the IRS from using such summonses to engage in "fishing
expeditions." ' Computer searches by the IRS seem to be precisely
the type of fishing expedition which Congress intended to prohibit.
At the very least, the IRS should be required to adhere to the con-
182. Coates, supra note 2.
183. "1 am not yet ready to agree that America is so possessed with evil that we must
level all constitutional barriers to give our civil authorities the tools to catch criminals." Cali-
fornia Bankers' Assoc. v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 86 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
184. See I W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 3.2 (Supp. 1984).
185. 26 U.S.C. § 7609(f) (1982); United States v. Samuels, Kramer and Co., 712 F.2d
1342, 1345 (9th Cir. 1983).
186. 712 F.2d at 1345 (emphasis added).
187. Id. at 1346 (quoting In re Tax Liabilities of John Does, 688 F.2d 144, 149 (2d.
Cir. 1982)).
[Vol. 25
IRS DATA BANK SEARCHES
straints of a John Doe summons before commencing its computer
searches.
When the Constitution's framers enacted the fourth amend-
ment, hoping to eliminate the "primary evil" of intrusive tax collec-
tion, '88 they understood the necessity of restraining searches with
the requirements of specificity and probability. Current administra-
tive summons provisions which attempt to curb IRS fishing expedi-
tions also incorporate essential elements of the fourth amendment.SB
Present day computer searches of data banks, contrariwise, circum-
vent the essential elements of probability and specificity embodied in
the fourth amendment and administrative summonses.' 90 Until the
Internal Revenue Service complies with the essentials of the fourth
amendment, an invasion of a data bank subject's expectation of pri-
vacy in data concerning his or her personal affairs should justify a
cause of action under the fourth amendment's search and seizure
clause.
V. CONCLUSION
.With the dramatic increase in taxpayer noncompliance, the In-
ternal Revenue Service perceives a justification for utilizing com-
puter searches of data banks to identify tax evaders. Having access to
thousands of data banks, including those of government agencies
networked throughout the country by the latest in computer technol-
ogy, the IRS can hunt through millions of records concerning the
most intimate details of citizens' lives. Surreptitious searches of data
bank subjects by the IRS without restraint raises possible violations
of constitutional protections. Yet case law relating to possible inva-
sions of an individual's privacy and associational rights do not supply
necessary protections to a data bank subject. Nor do numerou.s statu-
tory provisions, such as the Privacy Act of 1974, afford the individ-
ual any substantive protection.
In light of the absence of effective constitutional and statutory
protections against IRS computer data bank searches, the fourth
amendment may be the only restraint on the IRS against such
searches. Because an individual possesses a legitimate expectation of
privacy in his personal data maintained in computer data banks, the
188. See supra notes 94-95 and accompanying text.
189. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. at 445-46.
190. See supra notes 155-170 and accompanying text for a discussion of the specificity
requirement against general searches and notes 171-189 and accompanying text for a discus-
sion of the probability element of probable cause.
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fourth amendment constraints apply.
While the fourth amendment typically does not protect matters
knowingly exposed to the public, information compulsorily gained by
the government from an individual in return for licenses and benefits
is deserving of protection. Similarly, in order to function in today's
society, an individual must rely upon the goods and services of third
parties who, in the ordinary course of business, require information
concerning the individual's private affairs. Society does retain some
expectation of privacy in this material despite the fact that it is "vol-
untarily" relinquished to third persons.
Nevertheless, the United States Supreme Court has been un-
willing to recognize a "reasonable" expectation of privacy in third-
party records such as bank records concerning an individual's finan-
cial transactions. However, the Court has yet to rule on the applica-
bility of the fourth amendment as a restraint on computer data bank
searches. Notwithstanding the United States Supreme Court's posi-
tion, contrary state supreme court decisions granting greater defer-
ence to privacy expectations, statutory provisions purporting to ex-
tend protections-yet failing to do so-and societal expressions of
fear for computer matches, all suggest that data bank subjects. truly
deserve recognition of their reasonable expectations of privacy under
the fourth amendment.
Searches within an individual's zone of privacy are prohibited
except by a warrant based on probable cause particularizing the
items or information sought. To substantiate probable cause, the offi-
cial seeking authority to search must demonstrate that the search
subject more probably than not has violated a law. Bare suspicion
alone is not sufficient to justify a search. A computer search, initiated
without any suspicion of wrongdoing by individual data bank sub-
jects, is a massive dragnet combing through millions of data files
with an eye toward generating "suspects." Therefore, general com-
puter data bank searches by the IRS-void of both probable cause
and particularity-derogate the requirements of the fourth
amendment.
In the words of Justice Mosk of the California Supreme Court:
"Cases are legion that condemn violent searches and invasions of an
individual's right to the privacy of his dwelling. . . .Development
of . . .electronic computers . . have accelerated the ability of gov-
ernment to intrude into areas which a person normally chooses to
exclude from prying eyes and inquisitive minds. Consequently, judi-
cial interpretations of the reach of the constitutional protections of
individual privacy must keep pace with the perils created by these
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new devices." '191 So too, federal courts must keep pace with the perils
created by IRS computer data bank searches.
Robert Messick
191. Burrows v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. 3d 238, 247-48, 529 P.2d 590, 596, 118 Cal.
Rptr. 166, 172 (1975).
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